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Introduction 
As things began to fall apart in Syria in early 
2011, the Lebanese Hezbollah was 
confronted by a potentially major policy 
problem. Syria shares long borders with 
Lebanon. Numerous tribes, ethnic groups and 
families straddle those borders, making the 
threat of contagion an obvious one. This is 
amplified by the fact that, like Lebanon, Syria 
is a ‘mosaic’ society, with Arab and Kurd, 
and Sunni, Shiʿa, Alawi, Christian and Druze 
communities living side by side, often in 
enclaves. Conflicts between communities on 
one side of the border always have the 
potential to ignite conflicts between those 
same communities on the other. Of course, 
these are problems for neighbours that 
complement, rather than replace, those 
associated with conflict societies in general; 
increased organised crime in border regions 
and potential for intervention by foreign 
adversaries being just the two most obvious.  
The Syrian Government soon took to military 
action, besieging the southern city of Daraʿa 
with artillery and armour on 25 April. Protest 
became revolution, with groups such as the 
Free Syrian Army and various Islamist 
factions emerging from corps of defecting 
soldiers and released or escaped prisoners. 
On 12 July 2012, Syria was acknowledged to 
be in a state of civil war by the United 
Nations. Hezbollah’s potential problem had 
become something very real. 
From the very beginning, Hezbollah threw its 
full support behind the embattled regime of 
President Bashar al-Asad, starting with an 
information operations campaign across its 
various media and swiftly moving to 
intervene militarily.1 Despite the apparent 
inevitability of this policy,2 neither the nature 
of Hezbollah’s engagement nor its choice of 
allegiance was necessarily pre-ordained. 
Nowhere is this better demonstrated than by 
the counter-example of one of its Arab 
Twelver Shiʿi Islamist counterparts in Iraq, 
the Sadrist Movement. The Sadrists not only 
refused to join Hezbollah and other militias 
in a sectarian coalition, but even went so far 
as to condemn such an intervention as a gross 
infringement of Syrian sovereignty. This 
exacerbated an ongoing row between the two 
hitherto fraternal groups over policy towards 
Syria.  
Yet, Iraq too shares long borders with Syria. 
The complications of cross border tribes, 
ethnic groups and families, as well as 
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‘mosaic’ societies, are as pressing for Iraq as 
for Lebanon. And of course, the general  
problems stemming from civil war are a 
potential issue for all states and societies 
bordering Syria. Moreover, both Hezbollah 
and the Sadrist Movement are Islamist-
nationalist Twelver Shiʿa Arab actors that 
maintain social, political and armed wings. 
Both have developed from resistance 
movements and have sought at times to 
surpass the state in the provision of social 
services such as water, electricity, and waste 
disposal, as well as security, and law and 
order. Both inhabit consociational polities, 
which are situated in a conflict-prone region 
that they share with a host of often adversarial 
actors. There is an important genealogical 
link between the two movements,3 which has 
long been complemented by cordial political, 
ideological, and military relations. It was not 
so long ago that Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of 
the Sadrist Movement, claimed that his 
movement models itself on Hezbollah. How 
and why did two such similar actors from 
such comparable societies behave so 
differently when confronted by the same 
phenomenon? How is it that these self-
proclaimed allies did not share the same 
stance, or, for that matter, why were their 
positions not inverted? 
This paper seeks to explain how and why the 
policies of Hezbollah and the Sadrist 
Movement towards the Syrian Civil War 
differed so markedly. Although we might 
expect to see similar Syria policies from the 
two actors, we see nothing but difference. 
Nowhere is the effect on policy of the many 
overlooked or even unseen cognitive, 
ideological, organisational and contextual 
differences between the Sadrist Movement 
and Hezbollah demonstrated more clearly 
than in their utterly opposing policies towards 
the Syrian Civil War and the protests that 
preceded it. Whilst the Sadrist Movement 
holds dear the principles of state sovereignty 
and national popular self-determination, 
leading to a policy of non-interventionism, 
Hezbollah is compelled to engage in what it 
depicts as new front in the global zero-sum 
conflict between oppressor and resistance. 
Hezbollah and Intervention 
in Syria 
From the first days of the Syrian protests in 
March 2011, Hezbollah could not have taken 
a more supportive stance towards the 
government. This was in stark opposition to 
the movement’s previous enthusiasm for the 
‘Arab Spring’ elsewhere, particularly in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain. As the 
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conflict spiralled from protests and 
crackdowns to low-level violence and then 
outright civil war, Hezbollah’s policy also 
developed. There were two stages to it: 
Firstly, statements and demonstrations of 
support for the government and 
dissemination of pro-regime propaganda; 
secondly, active military involvement 
alongside the government against rebel 
forces. Accordingly, we see change in 
Hezbollah discourse over the course of the 
conflict. The language4 in the Hezbollah 
representation of events helps us to 
understand how the situation could be 
constructed as requiring rhetorical support 
and then military involvement. It also reveals 
aspects of cognition that, with assessment of 
further contextual factors, aid us in 
completing the picture to explain why it was 
so constructed.  
During the first few months of unrest, 
Hezbollah underplayed or even 
underreported the demonstrations and the 
crackdowns. Instead, it highlighted5 the 
support that the regime allegedly enjoyed 
among a large proportion of the Syrian 
populace.6 Hezbollah media emphasised the 
scale of pro-government gatherings and 
elucidated the reasons behind the Syrian 
people’s loyalty to Bashar al-Asad, namely 
the security that he assured them from foreign 
aggression and from anarchy. For example, in 
early February, Hezbollah claimed that 
Syria’s “resistance dignity is the reason for 
immunity to revolution.”7 According to 
Hezbollah, Syria was paying “a tax for its 
resistance to Israel and Judaezation [and][...] 
its support for Lebanon and Palestine”.  
The reason given was that “Israel and its 
allies want to turn the clock back, to before 
the victory of the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions”. But Hezbollah was supposed to 
be propagandising against revolution in 
Syria, arguing that Israel was behind it all. It 
seems odd to frame the revolutions in Tunisia 
and Egypt as a ‘victory’, detrimental to Israel. 
How could it claim that Israel was at once a 
reactionary, counter-revolutionary force in 
Tunisia and Egypt and behind the unrest in 
Syria? There is an logic at play, however. The 
Tunisian and Egyptian regimes were 
represented by Hezbollah as pro-US and pro-
Israeli. Their collapse was a blow to US and 
Israeli regional designs and a boon to the 
resistance against them. For Hezbollah, the 
Arab people stand against the US and Israel, 
yet their governments often betray them. 
Since the Syrian government already 
opposed Israel, there was no discord between 
the people and the regime. ‘Israel and its 
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allies’ sought to ‘turn the clock back’ by 
bringing down the Syrian regime, thereby 
counter-acting the loss of their allies Tunisia 
and Egypt but also effecting a loss in the 
‘resistance’ camp. Hezbollah sustained this 
impression through reports such as that about 
the ‘millions’ of text messages sent from 
Israel to Syria urging an uprising (“third 
parties continue to broadcast lies about the 
situation in Daraʿa, making claims about 
messages and pictures arriving from inside 
the city and the occurrence of massacres and 
inciting the people and intimidating them”), 
as well as weapons and ammunition being 
delivered across the border.8 
This reiterated a ‘bad faith model’ of Israel 
that was already long established in 
Hezbollah discourse, as well as the 
attribution of all local and regional problems 
to Israel and the US. Discursive and 
behavioural intersubjective processes 
between Hezbollah and those actors 
engendered these impressions, but there were 
also very real historical precedents that make 
these models salient. That said, we should 
understand that this construction assuaged 
dissonance stemming from Hezbollah’s 
support for the ‘Arab Spring’ elsewhere and 
its reticence about it in Syria. Hezbollah 
needed to perceive and depict events thus. 
Syria was the ‘resistance corridor’ for Iranian 
arms to reach Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
Moreover, Hezbollah’s prior representation 
of the ‘Arab Spring’ as a ‘resistance’ project 
would be in some ways harder to revise than 
simply employing this explanatory logic.  
Gradually, the Hezbollah narrative 
established that the unrest was indicative of a 
‘conspiracy’ against Syria.9 Events in Syria 
were part of the US ‘domino theory’ 
approach to the region, in light of the failure 
of the invasion of Iraq.10 Regime victory in 
Syria and successful revolutions elsewhere 
would “destroy US hegemony”.11 This 
narrative followed an archetypal pattern, 
namely a US-Zionist plan to spread chaos and 
division in Middle East, due to the influence 
of organisations like the Project for the New 
American Century and AIPAC, in order to 
break any resistance so that Israel could 
become totally dominant in the region.12 
Protests in Syria were linked to 
Israel/Zionists and the US, to conspiracy, to 
projects, to chaos, to division, to hegemony, 
and to oppression. In contrast, the regime was 
linked to Syria (as opposed to foreign 
entities), to Lebanon and Palestine, to 
resistance, to the people, to Arabs, to 
Muslims, and to freedom. Hezbollah 
described President Asad as a “bulwark 
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against everything plotted against Syria”.13 
Notably, the representation of events in Syria 
in the movement’s English language media 
was somewhat muted, highlighting only the 
mass support that the regime enjoyed.14 This 
indicates a different framing for the English 
language readership, namely the legitimacy 
of the majority, as opposed to resistance. 
Whether one or both is disingenuous or 
instrumental is unimportant; they either form 
and/or reflect Hezbollah interests. 
Shortly, Hezbollah began to mobilise, using 
its Arabic media channels to call for massive 
demonstrations in Beirut in support of the 
Syrian regime.15 The phrasing of the call is 
instructive, and it is worth citing in full, not 
least as an example of the use of internet 
media to influence political behaviour among 
supporters: 
In solidarity with brotherly Syria, in 
the face of the Western, American-
Zionist scheme to undermine the 
national and pan-Arab resistance axis, 
having the honour to meet with 
Lebanese national parties and forces 
and the Alliance of Palestinian Forces, 
we cordially invite you to participate 
in this manifestation in solidarity 
with Syria’s Asad.16 
Note the elision of “brotherly Syria” and 
“Syria’s Asad”, the allusion to a “Western, 
American-Zionist scheme to undermine the 
national and pan-Arab resistance axis”. 
Observe also the attribution to “Western, 
American-Zionist” Others of causal 
responsibility for the problem, and the tacit 
analogy drawn between the Lebanese and 
Palestinian resistance to Israel. We should 
bear in mind the conjunction of national and 
pan-Arab. What was happening was depicted 
as an attack on both a pan-Arab and a 
Lebanese national interest. There is a definite 
case to be made for Hezbollah needing to 
understand and represent it in this way, but 
the fact remains that it is entirely 
comprehensible that it would also expect 
events to be like this, given its own historical 
experience.  
A concerted effort was made to link Lebanese 
security with the situation in Syria, through 
phrases such as “Lebanon’s security is the 
security of Syria.”17 This is understandable, 
given that this was a time of intense 
wrangling over the formation of a 
government in Lebanon following tight 
elections. Hezbollah’s most bitter rival, the 
Sunni politician Saad Hariri, was attacked 
rhetorically for supporting the tribunal 
investigating the assassination of his father, 
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which indicted Hezbollah and Syria, and for 
the UN resolution demanding the disbanding 
of all Lebanese militias, including Hezbollah. 
This was connected by Hezbollah to the 
Syrian civil conflict, and thus to the regional 
resistance war against the US and Israeli 
project.18 Hariri was alleged to want to 
“depose Asad and get the Muslim 
Brotherhood into power”, as well as to “break 
the resistance” (both Hezbollah and Asad’s 
regime being the ‘resistance’).19 This added a 
domestic political slant to the representation 
of the Syrian civil conflict. It also tinged it 
with a sectarian colour, linking to the Sunni 
Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Moreover, by mention of the resistance it 
alluded to Israel, implying that the collapse of 
the regime would lead to Israeli and/or Sunni 
domination at home. We should note how the 
Future Party was represented as conspiring 
with foreigners against the nation, against 
Syria, and against a wider pan-Arab cause 
(the resistance).20 For example, the visit of 
US Envoy Jeffrey Feltman to Beirut, during 
which he met with Hariri, lending US support 
to his cause. This was framed by Hezbollah 
as an attempt to intervene in Syria using 
Lebanon as springboard.21 Indeed, according 
to Nabih Berri, the parliamentary speaker and 
leader of the Hezbollah aligned Amal Party, 
“the sole purpose of visits of foreign officials 
is to use Lebanon as a base to overthrow 
Syria”.22  
Whilst the Vice President of the Executive 
Council of Hezbollah, Shaykh Nabil Qaouk, 
stated unequivocally that the “resistance 
rejects foreign interference”,23 he also 
positioned Hezbollah to have legitimate 
grounds to intervene in response to any 
foreign interference. This was in direct 
reaction to the support afforded by Hariri’s 
Future Party and the Lebanon First initiative 
to the protesters in Syria: 
What is your priority, Lebanon First? 
You are targeting the resistance first 
and Syria first and Iran first. And why 
is ‘The Future’ Party intentionally 
dragging Lebanon into a war 
with Syria and Iran? In whose 
interest? Are you in favour of the state 
or rather crossing into US custody of 
Lebanon and the region?  
This text summarises Hezbollah’s 
dichotomous basic schema very nicely: 
Support for the protesters in Syria equated to 
war against the resistance, Iran and Syria. 
This could only be in the interests of the US, 
as opposed to the Lebanese state, with the 
implication being that the interest of the state 
was to align with Syria, Iran and ‘the 
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resistance’. This further underscores the 
elision of the domestic and the regional in 
Hezbollah’s representation of the situation. 
Again, this might illustrate how actors can 
both need and expect a situation to be a 
certain way, for its political interests in the 
first case and its historical experience and the 
precedent behaviour of other actors in the 
latter.  
As the conflict developed into an armed 
uprising, it was linked to the wider struggle, 
with the rebels operating “hand-in-hand” 
with the US-Zionist enemy to “weaken the 
regional resistance”, through the destruction 
of the Asad regime.24 By the end of June, 
Hezbollah identified a “US-Israeli war on 
Syria”25 and a US-Turkish-Israeli “trinity” 
conspiracy,26 all linked to Syria’s role in 
resistance against Israel.27  
This was a turning point in Hezbollah 
discourse. It completed the linking of the 
regime to Hezbollah, bolstering the analogy 
of ‘resistance’ war and facilitating the 
attribution to ‘the Other’ the responsibility 
for all wrong. The decision of the Arab 
League to suspend Syria, impose sanctions, 
express support for the opposition and call for 
the army to rebel lies largely at its heart, as 
this was, of course, exactly what Hezbollah 
was expecting to happen in line with the US-
Israeli project for the region. Indeed, in late 
2011, Hezbollah began to talk about 
“protecting” the border and cracking down 
upon arms smuggling, stating that it would 
“beat with an iron hand those who have 
started to tamper with stability and security in 
the brother country [Syria], as this has serious 
repercussions for Lebanon”.28 This 
underscored the notion that other actors were 
trying to use Lebanon as a conduit or base to 
attack Syria, further linking the conflict to 
Lebanese affairs.29 By connecting war in 
Syria to regional war to Lebanon, Hezbollah 
constructed an idea that it is all connected, so 
that it became feasible to state openly that 
“perhaps Hezbollah would also feel 
compelled to war if things worsened in the 
region to the extent of threatening its fate and 
its resistance and its allies”.30 
Hezbollah began to plan overtly for military 
involvement, although it was framed as being 
reactive and defensive. In order to stop Israel, 
NATO and Turkey moving against Asad, 
Hezbollah publicised what it called a 
“coordinated plan to bomb Tel Aviv”.31 It 
established “red lines” related to any actual 
collapse of the regime, the breaching of 
which would make intervention possible,32 
even a rational and responsible thing to do in 
an atmosphere of “mounting pressure and 
violence”.33 This contributed to an 
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overarching theme that everything was 
building up to a massive regional war, an 
Israeli, US and Western invasion of Syria. It 
was connected to Lebanon by Hezbollah’s 
reports on those in Syria who said that, if they 
won there, they would come to Lebanon and 
fight Hezbollah34 and that the March 14 
Alliance was planning with the US as part of 
the Syria campaign to deploy operations in 
Lebanon.35  
By late 2011, Hezbollah was representing the 
situation as part of a global conflict, with a 
coalition that had begun to form against the 
US/Western plot, mainly centring on Russia 
and Iran.36 In fact, Hezbollah even sent a 
delegation to Moscow37 and to China38 in 
order to shore up this coalition. We should 
note Hezbollah’s positioning of itself as a 
major player, standing shoulder to shoulder 
with Moscow, Beijing and Tehran against 
Washington and Tel Aviv. This self-
aggrandising even led it bizarrely to praise 
Syria for choosing the ‘Lebanese model’ 
rather than the ‘Libyan model’,39 by which it 
meant resistance to US and Western 
hegemony as opposed to collusion, citing 
itself as the inspiration for such a choice. All 
this was happening in a context of continued 
talk of the “next war”,40 with the plan for 
Syria and Lebanon the same as that for Iraq,41 
namely a “multinational attack on Syria”.42 In 
standing against this alleged intervention in 
Syria, Hezbollah began to outline the “need 
for a unified stance”,43 which presumably 
silenced dissent. Once again, Hezbollah’s 
narrative demonstrated classic attribution 
error, assigning omnipotence to a perceived 
enemy,44 and overegging its complex, multi-
stage plan.45   
The constant theme when it comes to external 
intervention was the threat to Lebanon, and 
the necessity of Hezbollah intervention to 
protect against it.46 This was only bolstered 
by the kidnappings of Lebanese civilians 
from across the border that (according to 
Hezbollah) the international community had 
done nothing to stop.47 Interestingly, this 
presages its policy of open intervention, but 
does this reflect what they were thinking of 
doing or what they were already doing? That 
is to say, was its discourse constitutive or 
instrumental? The distinction does not 
necessarily matter, as it is perfectly possible 
that it was both at once, and ultimately even 
if it was initially instrumental, such discourse 
in itself becomes constitutive.  
At this point, Hezbollah discourse fully 
entered the second stage. It began to focus 
increasingly on where and how every other 
actor was involved in Syria48 and essentially 
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became ‘war rhetoric’. With hindsight, one 
can see that it was preparing its readership for 
the coming announcement that it had sent 
troops in to Syria. It reported more often on 
the growing takfiri threat, for example widely 
publicising the al-Qa’ida in Iraq and al-Nusra 
merger and their announcement that it had 
always been a franchise.49 Notably, it began 
to focus more on the fighting and terrorist 
attacks around the Shiʿi shrine of Sayyidah 
Zaynab in southern Damascus,50 claiming 
that the opposition groups had stated they 
would destroy it if they took that area.51 This 
was patent sectarian agitation. Moreover, it 
continued to talk (as it had done since 2006) 
about the “coming war with Israel”. This 
established a mind-set for war and also, when 
there were war, that it would be against Israel 
(just waged in a slightly different place).52 
Of course, Secretary General Hasan 
Nasrallah publicly confirmed Hezbollah’s 
military presence in Syria in May 2013, 
following the instrumental role that 
Hezbollah fighters played in retaking the 
town of al-Qusayr from rebel forces.53 Since 
then, Hezbollah fighters were reported 
fighting further afield as auxiliaries of regime 
forces, notably in/around Homs and the 
Lebanese border, and being particularly 
instrumental in the regime victory in the 
battle of Qusayr. It is important to note that 
Hezbollah media representations of the 
announcement stated that Hasan Nasrallah 
“was careful at the same time to suggest that 
this intervention is still localized and 
confined to discrete tasks, and did not amount 
to the level of full participation in the fighting 
alongside the regime against its opponents, 
without ruling out this possibility if the war 
were to evolve”.54 Namely, given the prior 
representations of the conflict, Hezbollah 
engagement was restricted in terms of 
legitimacy to the border and just beyond, and 
around Sayyidah Zaynab. Its media discourse 
shifted to justifying this, albeit using the prior 
framing.55 It is worthwhile citing in full 
Hezbollah’s explanation of why it intervened 
in Syria: 
Because of mutual influence, 
especially of the Syrian side on 
Lebanon, perhaps it was necessary for 
Hezbollah and its allies of progress to 
defend themselves in battle, and thus 
to make void the charge ‘Lebanese 
forces involved’, as the battleground is 
Lebanese. Now we have reached this 
massive and obvious conflict of 
international depth, there is no longer 
isolation according to the list of 
entities [meaning states/borders]. It is 
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a battle between global axes, the 
battleground is Syria, and all states are 
concerned, no longer does it makes 
sense to accuse of involvement or non-
involvement. So, it was obvious that 
not only Hezbollah is an involved 
party in the Syrian conflict, but also all 
the forces allied with it in the glorious 
coalition camp in the defence of 
strategic interests and common 
destiny.56 
After openly admitting intervention in Syria, 
Hezbollah adopted a much more bullish 
approach in its media narratives. It praised 
the close working relationship and warm 
links and respect between Iraqi jihadis and 
Hezbollah,57 and effectively depicted the 
Syrian opposition as working with Israel as 
part of a Zionist plot,58 given Israeli air strikes 
on government positions.59  
So, how and why did Hezbollah come to 
adopt a policy of intervention in 
neighbouring Syria? Having increasingly 
represented the uprisings of the ‘Arab Spring’ 
as analogous to its own struggle, to the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution, and to the 
Palestinian liberation cause, there was 
significant dissonance when the ‘Arab 
spring’ arrived in the heart of fellow member 
of the “resistance axis”, Syria. This was, of 
course, because of the representation of the 
‘Arab Spring’ as being part of the resistance 
struggle against Western-Zionist 
imperialism, as opposed to an instance of 
people against regime. The fact that Western 
aligned actors supported the protests in Syria, 
and that the regime had already been 
established as a resistance actor, meant that 
the uprisings could be represented as a tit-for-
tat move. A number of Western aligned 
governments had fallen and so this was an 
attempt to strike at the vital ‘resistance 
corridor’. Moreover, this was a clear threat to 
the movement itself, with respect to 
resistance project on the whole and in 
Lebanon, and was linked to domestic threats, 
and thereby a need was constructed. In fact, 
Hezbollah and Lebanon, as part of the 
‘resistance axis’, were represented as already 
being involved, so Hezbollah had to react.  
And, of course, it could countenance 
intervention because its construction of 
political reality was centred on a conflict 
between a resistance axis and a Western-
Zionist imperialist project rather than being 
about states per se.  
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The Hezbollah-Sadrist 
Dispute 
In direct contrast to Hezbollah’s clear stance, 
the Sadrist Movement espoused an 
ambivalent stance on Syria. It generally 
accepted the calls of the protesters and rebels 
for democracy and an end to authoritarian 
rule in Syria as legitimate,60 maintained that 
this was a matter for the Syrian people to 
resolve through dialogue and reform, but 
urged that they should first concentrate on 
defeating Israel.61 That said, the movement 
vociferously condemned the Israeli strike on 
a Syrian weapons shipment in early May 
2013,62 sought to block the Arab League 
suspension of Syria, and like Hezbollah, 
identified foreign and Western hands at play 
in the Syrian conflict.63 Yet, it is fair to say 
that its stance on the protests in Syria were 
largely in line with its broader support for the 
‘Arab Spring’, in contrast to Hezbollah’s 
rather apparent volte-face. 
The stance taken by the Sadrist Movement 
led to a furious dispute breaking out between 
it and Hezbollah, first made public in a report 
in the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Siyassah al-
Kuwaytiyyah64 but not denied by either party, 
and later largely substantiated. According to 
the report, Hezbollah levelled accusations of 
treason against the Sadrist Movement, on the 
basis that the Lebanese actor’s strategy65 that 
all Shiʿa should be involved in the defence of 
Asad’s regime was being negatively affected 
by the Sadrist Movement’s attempts to 
dissuade Iraqi militiamen aligned to the 
breakaway Sadrist faction Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq 
(AAH) and Prime Minister al-Maliki from 
supporting Hezbollah, and by its general 
position that Iraqis should not be involved.66 
This overt attack on the Sadrist Movement’s 
policy, and (perceived) interference in its 
continuing domestic conflict with AAH and 
al-Maliki, prompted a furious response from 
Muqtada al-Sadr, who not only stated that 
Hezbollah should not make any demands of 
his movement, but also criticised the 
involvement of Hezbollah and other Shiʿa 
militias for their support of a bloody 
dictatorship, claiming that Hezbollah had 
now killed more Syrians than Israelis. This 
state of affairs was broadly substantiated in 
an interview with al-Hayat newspaper in late 
2013, in which Muqtada al-Sadr stated 
categorically that “[m]y official, true 
position — without any pretence — is this: 
What is happening in Syria is an internal 
issue and no one is entitled to interfere. The 
people want to determine their own fate, so 
what say do I or politicians have in it? [...] 
[Hezbollah] have their own policies and I 
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have mine”.67 In this interview it was also 
mentioned that the Sadrist Movement had 
raised Free Syrian Army flags at least one of 
its rallies, which is not without significance. 
Al-Sadr has since called for Bashar al-Asad 
to step down. 
In the context of two apparently ideologically 
aligned Arab Twelver Shiʿa Islamist 
movements, this represents an important 
development. Such movements generally 
maintain a united front in the public sphere. 
There are personal and familial links between 
the leadership and membership of each,68 a 
history of Hezbollah involvement in Iraq, and 
a number of mutual statements of support 
during the years 2003-2011.69 Senior cadres 
or leaders of the two movements have held 
meetings together in Iraq or Lebanon on a 
number of occasions and also jointly attended 
meetings with third or other parties, such as 
Syria and Iran.70 The disagreement over 
Syrian policy and the public attacks on one 
other’s stance marks a significant break from 
precedent and is indicative of a substantial 
difference in political identity. The case of 
Syria is striking because the interests of each 
were so potentially at threat and also diverse 
that they were bound to clash. It is also of 
particular interest because Sadrist policy was 
so at odds with that of broader Iraqi society 
and indeed the Iraqi state.71  
Understanding Sadrist 
Non-interventionism 
Constancy in Sadrist policy towards the 
conflict in Syria was paralleled by constancy 
in discourse about it. Yet, in contrast to the 
salience of the matter in Hezbollah discourse, 
the Sadrist Movement appeared to want to 
not talk about Syria. Muqtada al-Sadr issued 
a number of communiques and missives 
about the situation in Syria, in which he 
clearly represented as legitimate the demands 
of the protesters for greater freedoms, 
increased democracy, and less corruption. 
Indeed, he even used the term ‘injustice’ to 
refer to the situation in Syria, and stated that 
“we hope to be of help to all the 
revolutionaries/rebels in Syria or Bahrain or 
Yemen or Egypt or elsewhere.”72 However, 
this apparent commitment to the rebel cause 
was not quite as unequivocal as it seems. In 
the same text, al-Sadr used the phrase 
“America is the sponsor of the injustice” 
(emphasis added). This puts quite a different 
spin on the situation definition; there is 
injustice in Syria (and elsewhere) ultimately 
sponsored by the US, and the Sadrist 
Movement supports all those rebelling 
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against it. This is an ambiguous definition of 
the situation and, potentially, a very good 
way of avoiding having to express support for 
one side or the other. However, whether or 
not it is instrumental discourse, it also 
represented the situation in quite a different 
manner to both Hezbollah and much of 
Western media. Like Hezbollah, it was not 
about democracy versus dictatorship, as it 
was for much Western media, but unlike 
Hezbollah, the grander conflict that it was a 
part of did not involve one side or the other. 
It was far more transcendental; a grand battle 
against injustice which operated on a totally 
different level to the conflict actually 
underway in Syria.  
This explains how al-Sadr could also 
maintain that the affair in Syria is something 
for the people to resolve through dialogue 
and reform and that they should first 
concentrate on defeating Israel and 
confronting the US.73 In fact, it is important 
to note that al-Sadr made clear that “there is 
a big difference between you [Syria] and the 
rest of the great revolutions in Tunisia and 
Egypt and Libya and Bahrain and Yemen”. 
Al-Sadr presented the differences as follows: 
Firstly, “some of your territory remains 
occupied for you to liberate, or for the 
government to liberate in cooperation with 
you, oh proud and beloved people”. 
Secondly, “neighbouring Iraq is still 
occupied[...] dragging Syria into civil war 
would make it susceptible to the brutal fangs 
of America”. As shall be seen, this self-
focused Iraq-centric framework lay at the 
core of the Sadrist response to the events in 
Syria, and is of foremost importance. Thirdly, 
“the creation of a power vacuum would put 
Syria in danger of falling into the abyss of 
terrorism and fragmentation”. Fourthly, it 
was not certain that Bashar al-Asad would 
fall just because of the US and Israeli 
presence. In both these third and fourth 
points, we see the impact of historical 
experience for al-Sadr. Clearly, the terrible 
civil war in which he became embroiled in 
Iraq made him reticent to extol the virtues of 
societal breakdown, but the tenacity of 
Saddam Hussayn despite Western antipathy 
from 1990-2003 also appears to have played 
a role here. Fifthly, “there are large crowds of 
the Syrian people whose opinion is in favour 
of the survival of the government”. Al-Sadr 
concluded that “this requires of you as a 
people to engage in dialogue and leave 
violence behind” before finishing by saying 
“our enemy is Israel and no other”. But was 
there a need or an expectation for the issue to 
appear in this way? Again, as in the case of 
Hezbollah, there were clearly both historical 
reasons for expecting to see it like this, but 
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also contextual motivators for wanting to, not 
least to maintain Iraqi security and 
sovereignty through avoiding societal 
breakdown next door.  
Iraq was one of the few Arab states to vote 
against the motion in the Arab League to 
suspend Syria in late 2011. Sadrist MP Uday 
Awad stated afterwards that “Iraq is today 
non-influential in the Arab world because of 
the domination and monopoly of the Gulf 
states on decisions”. He suggested that Iraq 
enter a coalition with Arab countries which 
also seek “change in authoritarian rule in the 
region”, such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, 
and Lebanon. As it stands, the Arab League 
is in “existence for those who want to 
undermine Iraq and its people”.74 This is an 
interesting representation of the region, 
transcending or ignoring domestic politics 
and instead focusing on the regional or 
international. Thus, ‘authoritarianism’ did 
not necessarily mean of the local 
government, but rather an international 
regime. This marked a quite striking change 
from the usual support afforded by the Sadrist 
Movement to the Arab League. It should be 
stressed that the Movement clearly 
considered that intervention would 
exacerbate conflict and lead to problems for 
Iraq itself. Moreover, there was a possibility 
that the concurrent adversarial relationship 
with Prime Minister Maliki, supported by the 
Arab League and international parties in 
general, had somewhat soured the Sadrist 
view at this time. Of course, it could simply 
be that a fit of pique lay at the kernel of this 
denunciation.  
All in all, however, it is clear that any Sadrist 
interest in Syria was always rather self-
focused. Indeed, it appears only to have been 
a salient issue at all due to the knock-on 
effects in Iraq. The rise of ISIS has shown 
that these can be very serious indeed, given 
the porous borders and communities which 
straddle them. For example, al-Sadr released 
a commentary on the spate of bombings in 
Baghdad throughout 2011, connecting them 
to the wider security situation in the ‘Middle 
East’ (meaning Syria). Al-Sadr stated that 
“politicians led to the deterioration of the 
security situation[...] with all that is 
happening in the Middle East there is 
deterioration leading to destabilization of 
security and safety, which affects the beloved 
Iraqi people”.75 The attribution of blame to 
“politicians” should be seen as an attack on 
Maliki and other political elites in Iraq and 
farther afield, in line with the Sadrist self-
conception as populist and representative of 
the people.  
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Like Hezbollah, the Sadrists framed the 
Syrian unrest as part of a global conflict 
between oppressor and oppressed. However, 
where Hezbollah put the government on the 
side of the right and the rebels, therefore, on 
the side of wrong, the Sadrists represented 
both sides as sharing the same true enemy; 
the problems facing each were caused by that 
same enemy. It was this re-allocation of the 
‘true’ problems facing Syria that facilitated 
the Sadrist condemnation of Turkey for its 
‘regional policeman’ role following its policy 
of support for the Syrian opposition, which it 
claimed was motivated by its desire to join 
the EU.76 This is interesting because it 
implies a defence of sovereignty and 
delegitimises any intervention, on the basis 
that intervention is exactly what the US, UK 
and Israel wants, in order to gain access and 
colonise. Therefore, anyone who seeks to 
intervene, in this latter case, Turkey, must be 
in their camp.  
According to Sadrist spokesman Qusay al-
Suhail, “Arab society recently began to take 
the perspective of Iraqi politicians in how to 
respond to crises and of which what is going 
on in Syria, reflecting the success of the Iraqi 
experience”.77 The Sadrist Movement, as an 
Iraqi actor, understood and empathised, but 
has emerged ‘better’, and therefore the 
Syrians would too. Still, outside these rather 
self-focused statements, the movement did 
not really have much to say about Syria in 
comparison with Hezbollah. Asked for his 
position on the Syrian conflict in early 2012, 
al-Sadr replied with a platitudinous statement 
laying blame once again at the feet of the US, 
Israel and the West.78 Civil war had been 
visited upon Syria by outsiders, in return for 
its “defiance”. Yet, neither the government 
nor the rebels was represented as siding with 
the outsiders. What was clear, however, 
through the linking of both Syrian sides with 
Arabs and in contradistinction to the “evil 
trinity” (the US, Israel and the UK), as well 
as through the emphasis on avoiding 
sectarianism and encouraging democracy, 
was the importance of nation and national 
cohesion. This was perhaps prompted by the 
Sadrist Movement’s own experience during 
the Iraqi Civil War, but we could see this as 
al-Sadr presciently talking about the Iraqi 
case per se, in a time in which sectarianism 
and sectarian division was on the rise, 
particularly due to Maliki’s policies in al-
Anbar province (which would eventually 
facilitate the arrival of IS in Iraq).  
Al-Sadr made a diplomatic visit to Kuwait in 
June 2012, during which he also spoke about 
events in Syria, issuing yet another 
hackneyed statement that opposed Western 
interference, and espoused a “centrist 
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attitude”, non-interventionism and support 
for popular self-determination.79 There 
seemed only one exception to this general 
rule of international relations, namely, Israel. 
The Sadrists were able to comment much 
more authoritatively on the bombing of a 
Syrian weapons shipment by the Israeli air 
force in early May 2013,80 condemning the 
“Zionist aggression against sister Syria”, by 
the ‘Zionist usurper’ which had resulted in 
“blatant suffering”. According to al-Sadr, this 
“emphasized the need to close ranks in this 
difficult phase in the life of the Islamic nation 
and the need to solve the problems of the 
brother country through dialogue[...] to spare 
the country from foreign intervention”. This 
was bolstered by the Sadrist assertion that 
there were Western hands at play in the 
Syrian conflict,81 helping to construct it as a 
situation in which all evil was caused by the 
notorious Western trinity, the US, the UK and 
Israel.  
In that vein, in a speech on the ‘Day of the 
Oppressed’ in May 2013,82 al-Sadr used the 
opportunity to call for an end to an end to the 
‘fratricide’ in Syria and Bahrain, demanding 
Islamic unity in the face of greater, universal 
threats like colonialism. There was a certain 
vagueness to the Sadrist position. It is clear 
enough that the movement supported the 
fight of the Arab and Muslim peoples against 
Western and Zionist occupation, colonialism 
and aggression. It is equally obvious that the 
movement supported freedom and self-
determination as well as national sovereignty. 
And it is apparent that the fight against 
Western curtailments of those concepts was 
the priority for all peoples of the region. But 
it is not at all self-explanatory where the 
movement actually stood on the Syrian 
conflict, beyond that these issues confronted 
all Syrians, both regime and opposition, and 
that it should be resolved. That is to say, it is 
not at all obvious which ‘side’ the movement 
ultimately came down on. Thus, it comes as 
no surprise that a follower of al-Sadr sent in 
a question in mid 2013, to the following 
effect: 
On the social networking site Twitter, 
on the page that concerns you, 
appeared a statement saying that you 
are guiding people to the fighting in 
Syria and that you support Bashar al-
Asad and that you say he will win. Is 
this really you or media against you? 
Given the prevarications and ambiguity of al-
Sadr over the two years of the conflict,83 this 
seems understandable. Another follower 
posed almost the same question: “There is a 
person belonging to you and urging youth to 
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fight in Syria, what do you say to him and 
us?”.84 Sadr’s replies to these are wily in the 
extreme. To this latter question, he replied: 
“Where is the evidence?”. To the former, 
there was no pinning Sadr down: “I have 
announced my position repeatedly. However, 
some parties want to change it falsely and 
slanderously”. In fact, it is hard to find much 
definitive about the situation at all, rather 
than vague and ambiguous statements such as 
these. For example, following the murder of 
Muhammed Saeed al-Bouti, the statement by 
Sadr mourned “another loss at the hands of 
wrongdoers who target clerics and moderate 
voices of Islam and peace”.85 
Towards the end of 2013, a question was 
posed by Iraqi armed forces officers about 
their problems on the Iraq/Syria border, with 
respect to transgressions by parties in the 
Syrian Civil War and their lack of knowledge 
about the extent of their powers with respect 
to preventing or deterring them.86 Sadr’s 
answer was that he would work for their 
victory through Parliament, by getting 
authority to strengthen and empower the 
border army and give them added powers in 
order to stave off ‘terrorism’. This implies at 
least a tendency towards the Asadist side; it 
is not the Syrian Army that Sadr is worried 
about, but rather ‘terrorism’. Yet, this 
contrasts with the presence of FSA flags at 
Sadrist rallies and is far from unambiguous. 
Moreover, it perhaps more than anything 
simply demonstrates the Sadrist 
preoccupation with Iraqi sovereignty and 
security rather than events in Syria, or at least 
the use of such concerns as a lens to engaging 
with events there.    
At a similar time, Sadr produced a short text 
about events in the Middle East.87 In it, he 
claimed that:  
[I]t has been colonialism that brought 
the Islamic nation and the Middle East 
and most of the nations to the crucible 
of war and poverty[...] the 
dissemination of poisonous ideas has 
made the body of Islam distracted and 
exhausted[...] a lethal weapon has 
subjected all nations having waived 
their religion and the foundations of 
their conversion to Islam, its rules and 
ordinances, and the clearest evidence 
of what happens is in the countries of 
Islam and the Middle East.  
Sadr is arguing that secularism, caused by 
colonialism, is at the heart of the problems 
here. So why not laud opposition to a secular 
regime? Why not support religious 
opposition? Perhaps the most telling Sadrist 
definition of the situation was to be found in 
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an interview with al-Hayat newspaper in late 
2013.88 It is worth citing certain sections of 
this interview in full, such are their 
contribution to clarifying much of the 
confusion in Sadrist discourse to date. 
Muqtada al-Sadr maintained that: “The Syria 
crisis involves settling disputes in bloody 
ways. None of the parties to the conflict are 
ethical, neither the extremist opposition nor 
others. The only victim is the Syrian people”. 
Yet, he also stated quite categorically that: 
“What is happening in Syria is an internal 
issue and no one is entitled to interfere. The 
people want to determine their own fate, so 
what say do I or politicians have in it?”. This 
demonstrates both the ambiguous stance of 
the Sadrist Movement, for whilst the 
opposition are described as “extremist”, by 
implication the government and its 
auxiliaries (including Hezbollah) are 
described as ‘unethical’. It also exemplifies 
Sadrist non-interventionism and support for 
self-determination. This was further 
reiterated when the interviewer noted that 
FSA flags had been raised at Sadrist 
celebration rallies, and asked whether Sadr 
intended to engage in dialogue with them, as 
indeed he had done with the Bahraini 
opposition. Sadr was unequivocal in his 
response, ignoring the question about the 
flags and stating that: “I do not have any 
intention to open a dialogue with them. The 
matter does not concern me. As I said, it’s a 
purely internal affair”. Again, this 
demonstrates Sadr’s unwillingness to become 
at all involved in the issue.  
However, being pushed on the issue of which 
side the Sadrist Movement supported, 
whether or not it would engage in dialogue 
with involved parties, and, furthermore, the 
Hezbollah policy of intervention, Sadr was 
curt in his reply. Stating that Hezbollah “have 
their own policies and I have mine”, he went 
on to emphasise that: “There has been no 
dialogue [between the Sadrist Movement and 
Hezbollah] in regards to Syria”. However, 
perhaps most telling was the question he fired 
back: “[W]hy are all dialogues focused on 
Syria? Yes, it is the most dangerous issue, but 
it’s not the only one. There are other issues 
such as Iraq, Bahrain, and many other 
political and Islamic ones”. Here we see 
clearly the Iraq-centric stance of the 
Movement, and a reference to broader issues 
which would act to consolidate as opposed to 
divide pan-Arab and pan-Islamic political 
trends, probably the Israeli-Palestinian 
question and US involvement in the Middle 
East. And why is there this focus on broader 
issues? Almost certainly for Iraqi domestic 
political consensus and security.  
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Explaining Divergence 
How should we explain this divergence? 
Turning back to Hezbollah, we must consider 
both the fundamental importance of the 
“resistance/oppressor” dyad for the party, and 
its espousal of the raison de resistance rather 
than the raison d’état. It follows that 
“foreign” and “domestic” lose relevance as 
analytic terms, as actors are principally 
identified according to their alignment in the 
global, zero-sum conflict, and the party’s 
relationship with each is dependent on this, 
rather than nationality. Indeed, everything is 
reinterpreted according to this overarching 
raison de resistance, including ‘nationalist’ 
terms, goals, and interests, such as 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Syrian 
sovereignty cannot be infringed by other 
resistance actors fighting the imperialist 
project in Syria. The implication of this for 
policy is striking; all resistance actors are 
reconceptualised as facets of the same 
overarching identity, whilst all their 
opponents must be part of the imperialist 
project, regardless of their actual stance 
towards the US or Israel. The important thing 
is an actor’s stance towards pre-defined 
resistance actors. Following from the interest 
of pursuing resistance wherever possible, the 
corollary here is that a blow against any of 
these enemy actors aids the global resistance, 
whilst aid to any resistance actor in the wider 
struggle – in this case Syria – effectively 
strikes a blow against the enemy. The fate of 
one is tied to the fate of all.  
In contrast, it is the nationalist-populist 
elements of the political identity of the 
Sadrist Movement that really affects how it 
acts politically. The core interests deriving 
from that identity are to rid Iraq of foreign 
influence and to increase Iraqi self-
determination, to dismantle the power of the 
elites, and to foster (Islamic) democracy in 
Iraq. The subset of interests derived from 
these lead the movement to invest thoroughly 
in the principles of state sovereignty and non-
interventionism. It is not in its interests to 
intervene in another state’s internal conflict. 
However much the movement may feel an 
allegiance to the downtrodden people of that 
state, or to those fighting against Sunni 
extremism, ultimately its interests clearly lie 
in sustaining the principle of non-
interventionism, insulating as well as 
possible from spill over, assisting Iraqi 
citizens to return home, and fence-sitting 
until relations beneficial to Iraq can be 
established with the winner when the dust 
settles. Effectively, this amounts to 
isolationism. With this in mind, it is 
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important to consider the conditions in which 
political calculations based on those interests 
are made.  
These facets of identity, and the associated 
interests, should be considered alongside the 
political conditions in which each actor 
formulates its political calculi. Hezbollah has 
largely enjoyed victory in Lebanon, at least 
as far as it can do given the demographic 
situation. It is thus free to pursue political 
struggles “abroad” (notwithstanding that this 
term is not used in the same way as we may 
think), although it should be noted that its 
Syrian “Vietnam” is causing alarm in 
Lebanon. Moreover, it is militarily robust, 
and at the beginning of the conflict was 
possibly in the best shape it had been; with its 
military capability intact and with experience 
of victory in battle, the military option is 
always on the table for Hezbollah. Equally, it 
is the case that the material and geopolitical 
well-being of the movement is intimately 
linked to the survival of the Syrian regime. 
Asad’s Syria is, after all, the famed 
‘resistance corridor’ and ‘pillar of the 
regional resistance’.89 Therefore, 
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria merges 
resistance to the agents of the imperialist 
project – the proxies of the US-Zionist plot – 
with very real political concerns over the 
survival of the resistance axis and the 
movement’s well-being itself 
(notwithstanding that the unit of analysis is 
not the state).  
For the Sadrist Movement, unlike for 
Hezbollah, there is still a domestic political 
struggle to win. This struggle is not just 
framed in terms of domestic politics, but, as 
could be expected, in terms of the 
“Iraqi/foreign” and “popular/elite” dyadic 
arrangements at the core of Sadrist identity. It 
is a struggle for the people and the nation. It 
is therefore paramount and surely outweighs 
ongoing issues in other states. It is also 
important to address the way in which the 
diffuse and demilitarised organisational 
structure of the Sadrist Movement affects 
decision making. The movement is in no 
position to embrace the military path; its 
military capacity is greatly restricted. 
Additionally, there is enough competition 
from AAH, which has largely dominated the 
military option, without blurring the 
boundaries of the two movements any more; 
individuals have already moved from one 
movement to the other, and back again. Thus, 
the Sadrist Movement may justifiably feel 
that involvement in the Syrian conflict will 
further fragment and dissolve the movement 
beyond the major schism with AAH. 
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According to its identity and interests, its 
major challenge lies at home; even if the 
movement were to also see a reason to be 
involved in Syria, it represents an enormous 
potential harm to be avoided. 
The Sadrist Movement views the Syrian 
conflict through the lens of Iraqi politics and 
uses it as an instrument to advance the 
political battle against rival Iraqi actors, 
particularly AAH and former Prime Minister 
Maliki, accusing them of being pawns of Iran 
in bigger game that should not and does not 
concern them, and for allowing putting 
Iranian interests before Iraq’s, risking spill 
over and Iraqi lives. This substantiates the 
notion of elites divorced from the people. In 
addition, the Sadrist Movement’s 
fragmentation and military neutralisation 
restrict its capacity to even countenance the 
military option. Yet the overarching espousal 
of a nation-statist representation of global 
politics renders possible the decision to leave 
‘Syrian conflict to the Syrians’; Syria is 
“abroad”, or “foreign”, and the movement 
has invested in the concepts of sovereignty 
and non-interventionism, largely to protect its 
own political project in Iraq. Effectively, 
Sadrist Syrian policy is not about Syria, but 
about Iraq.90 Indeed, Muqtada al-Sadr has 
argued for the international relations of the 
Middle East to be based upon this nationalist 
logic: “I would suggest developing a regional 
charter between Iraq [and other states], based 
on general common interests, without 
interference in internal affairs”.91 
Ultimately, in contradistinction to the 
Sadrists perception of the Syrian conflict 
through the lens of Iraqi politics, Hezbollah 
views it through the lens of the global battle 
against imperialism. Once external powers 
had clearly intervened in Syria, this is the 
only course of action that Hezbollah could 
have taken, given their political identity and 
associated interests. Moreover, Hezbollah’s 
adherence to a transnationalist representation 
of global politics facilitates intervention; the 
Syrian “Civil” War is effectively the latest 
front of the wider global conflict. Equally, 
borders have never meant much in the 
absolute; rather, they have always been 
subordinated to the raison de resistance. For 
Hezbollah, then, as for the Sadrist 
Movement, Syrian policy is not about Syria. 
Unlike for the Sadrist Movement, however, it 
is not about domestic political struggles, but 
instead about transnational anti-imperialist 
resistance.  
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Conclusion: Interventionism 
versus Isolationism 
The difference between Hezbollah and 
Sadrist policies towards the Syrian Civil War 
is striking. Hezbollah intervened militarily 
whilst the Sadrist Movement did not, despite 
the similarity in terms of threat posed by the 
conflict to each of their states and societies. 
Moreover, the two movements disagreed 
publicly on what was the moral stance, 
marking a serious division between the 
hitherto congenial allies.  
In order to explain how and why this came to 
be, I have analysed the stark differences in 
discourse between the two actors. Whereas 
Hezbollah constructed the Syrian Civil War 
as requiring intervention, the Sadrist 
Movement constructed it in a manner that 
deterred involvement. I sought to outline the 
cognitive and affective processes underlying 
these discursive constructions, and to 
highlight the contextual factors involved in 
the production of both. This case study is 
explained through the complex interplay 
between discourse and constructed realities, 
cognitive and affective processes, external 
domestic and regional factors, historical 
pathways, and intersubjectivity by which 
foreign policy is formulated. The analysis is 
important because of what it implies about 
the tendencies of Hezbollah and the Sadrist 
Movement towards intervention and 
isolationism, further nuancing our 
understanding of these actors. 
In short, Hezbollah re-articulated its raison 
d'être as fighting the US-Zionist plot for the 
region. This allowed it to turn volte-face on 
its previous policy of support for the ‘Arab 
Spring’ uprisings, and to facilitate a rationale 
– or even an obligation – for intervention. On 
the other hand, the Sadrist Movement re-
emphasised its raison d'être as the true and 
legitimate representative of the real Iraqi 
people, which, notwithstanding quite severe 
prevarication, engendered its policy of non-
intervention and even discursive ambiguity.  
Although the political thought of both 
Hezbollah and the Sadrist Movement stems 
from Twelver Shiʿi Islamism, they manifest 
profound divergences in approach to state 
and society. Moreover, there are far-reaching 
differences in organisational structure, 
domestic political context, and regional 
political environment. As a result, Hezbollah 
has become a transnationalist actor, in both 
interest and capability. In contrast, the Sadrist 
Movement has developed with a focus on the 
domestic political sphere. This is revealed in 
each actor’s construction of global politics. A 
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vision of conflict between oppressor and 
oppressed is common to both actors. Yet, 
Hezbollah’s markedly transnationalist 
identification of the locus of symptom and 
cure is in stark contrast to the Sadrist 
Movement’s siting of both in the state.  
This case study has demonstrated the real-
world outcomes of differences between the 
two actors in intellectual hinterland, 
organisational structure, domestic and 
regional political context, and construction of 
global politics. Whilst the Sadrist Movement 
emerges as a nationalist-populist actor whose 
foreign policies serve domestic goals, it is 
clear that Hezbollah’s politics on every level 
are designed to advance its transnationalist 
aims. 
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